An evolving impasse
The electorate created an impasse for the governance of the country when it voted 18-18, generally along ethnic lines, for the two major parties, the PNM and the UNC. The appointment of a PNM prime minister opened holes in the impasse without breaking it. There is a government even though there is neither an opposition nor a parliament. And there are ongoing talks between parties even though there is not a single iota of agreement yet. But the impasse is evolving, as oxymoronic as that may sound.
If an impasse is a position from which there is no escape, how can it evolve? The answer lies in the apparent absoluteness of the definition of the metaphor. It is easy to reinterpret the literal meaning of blind alley as the metaphorical position of no escape, but since a political situation is far more complex and dynamic than a dead-end road, the metaphor, if it can readily transfer only its physical properties, could fall short. It does so in our political situation, for there has been movement outwards even though the impasse is still there substantially.
The Manning administration is governing or, more accurately, the Manning government is administrating. It is spending money on public ventures, like this year's Carnival and commissions of inquiry. It is signing agreements, like the one with the PSA on a month's salary advance for public servants, and also the prospective one with Barbados on fishing in Tobagonian waters. It is reorganising the political (which is to say, in large measure, the ethnic) complexion of the decision-making process in state enterprises.
The UNC, for its part, is opposing outside a parliamentary framework. It opposes the fact of Manning as prime minister. It opposes the reconstitution of state boards. It opposes the payment of the salary advance to public servants. It opposes the planned payment of an increase of $200 to old-age pensioners. It opposes the establishment of commissions of inquiry. It opposes Manning's refusal to allow it equal participation in government.
There's been movement, therefore; not as much as some of us would like, but movement nonetheless. No laws are being passed, cabinet decisions are not receiving parliamentary interrogation and approval, but government and opposition are functioning. And the people are going about their routine business, even as they wait for greater movement.
The UNC wants, but does not expect, greater movement in the form of equal participation in government with the PNM. It wants 50% of the cabinet and non-cabinet MPs, the non-independent senators, and the state boards. But it does not want 50% of the prime ministership; it prefers fresh general elections. The very expression of this UNC desire represents a step in the evolution of the impasse. And so does the PNM promise to have its General Council study the UNC proposal.
So matters are definitely not at a standstill. But while the UNC plans its next step in the evolution and the PNM prepares to meet on the 50-50 powersharing proposal, let's consider some of the implications of that proposal.
If 18-18 means a 50-50 sharing of executive decision-making with a considerable constraining of prime ministerial power, what does 19-17 mean? And 20-16? And 21-15? And so forth? In the UNC mind, 18-18 triggered (and justified) the invocation of the 50-50 principle. But once triggered, the principle must hold in any permutation of 36, though the party isn't saying so. More clearly stated, the principle is the number of seats won by each of the various parties divided by the number of seats available multiplied by 100. Which means, for example, that if fresh general elections were to yield 19 seats for the UNC, 16 for the PNM, and 1 for the NAR (the same results as in the 2000 elections), the UNC would be entitled to some 52.7% of executive power, the PNM some 44.4%, and the NAR some 2.7%.
Assuming executive power could be reduced to quantification in terms of persons and there were, say, 22 senators to choose, it would be easy to split them up 50-50 - we would get two groups of 11 (whole) persons. But if we split that same number of persons 52.7-44.4-2.7, we would end up with roughly 11 and a half persons, 9 and seven tenths persons, and a half person, respectively. But since there can be no such thing as half of a senator (at least, not in bodily terms!), then the 50-50 principle as applied to this case would be patently absurd.
Applied to division of people, the 50-50 principle clearly cannot work. It is better suited to matters like revenue sharing and the budgeting of public expenditure in relation to different communities/ethnicities in the society. For example, it is far easier to rationally decide (on the basis of demographic data like percentage of voters, number of seats, and percentage of population) to spend a percentage of the national revenue on Tobago than to decide on how many (whole) Tobagonians should be in executive decision-making capacities.
But the UNC 50-50 formula has opened holes in the impasse. If they were to win the next general elections (whenever the latter are called), it would be extremely difficult for them to re-invoke the winner-takes-all principle. The principle can't be limited to a situation where there is a tie!
The impasse is evolving, I tell you.
Archives / Winford James Homepage / Previous Page
^^ Back to top
