The Successor
Who will be the next prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago, or the next chief secretary of Tobago? No one can tell, of course, but we can all be fairly sure that it will be one of the following types of persons: the incumbent prime minister or chief secretary; the leader of the opposition in parliament or the minority leader in the Tobago House of Assembly; or the deputy leader of the UNC in the event Basdeo Panday retires from partisan politics, whether voluntarily or involuntarily.
Of course, it could also be a compromise candidate, by which I mean a type of person, other than the three suggested above, that either holds the balance of power in an election situation where no party is a clear winner, or replaces, for one reason or another, the political leader of the winning party in an election. But our experience of succession makes us surer of the first three types than of the last.
Indeed, looking at the political picture as it now looks, we can fairly accurately predict that the next prime minister will be either Basdeo Panday or Patrick Manning or Carlos John or Ramesh Maharaj or Kamla Persad-Bissessar, and that the next chief secretary of Tobago will be either Orville London or Hochoy Charles. When the UNC holds its elections next month, the number of probabilities will reduce to two, Panday and somebody else; but when the PNM holds its elections later in the year, the number will not increase as deputy political leaders in an opposition party do not become prime ministers or chief secretaries in the presence of the political leader.
If we accept the (frankly uncertain) interpretation that Panday will be retiring either during this term of office or at the end of it - perhaps for health reasons, perhaps to make sure that succession within the UNC is clear and stable - then we can rule him out. If it is true that most PNM party members are tired of Manning's leadership, then we can rule Manning out as well. And if the Tobago NAR strips Charles of the leadership, as people like Christo Gift and Max James think is necessary for not only a NAR comeback but also NAR survival, then we can also rule out Charles. In these three cases, we are left with 1) either Persad-Bissessar or Maharaj or John in the UNC, 2) somebody in the national PNM, 3) Orville London in the Tobago PNM, and 4) somebody in the Tobago NAR.
On the principle that whoever is (or becomes) the leader of any of the four parties will become prime minister or chief secretary, we can ask the following questions. Has Panday been a good leader of Trinidad and Tobago, and in what sense has he been or not been? Are we satisfied that Maharaj, John and Bissessar have the qualities to lead Trinidad and Tobago, as distinct from the UNC, and what are the leadership qualities they have? Who in the PNM has impressed us as being suitable for running the nation, and what are their qualifications? Does London impress us with his leadership of Tobago so far, and, if so, in what way(s)? Who in the Tobago NAR has impressed us as being suitable as a replacement for London as chief secretary, and what are his/her qualifications?
But do these questions matter at all? Or, are the more pertinent questions the following? Who has Panday signalled as his anointed successor? Ent the UNC will get by with any crapaud they put? Who in the PNM commands the least disrespect in the party? Who in the PNM is a good match for Panday? Isn't it too early to judge London? Who the NAR go put if they get rid of Charles?
Regardless of which set of questions will impact most on the selection of a (n eventual) party leader, one fact is clear: the party will give nation or island its leader, and nation and island will have to take him or her. Since that is the case, shouldn't the rest of the nation seek to influence the choice of party leader?
But how, for the most comfortable choice to emerge?
There are huge hurdles to overcome. One is the unfortunate mindset that the selection of a party leader is exclusively the business of the party, which non-members, except the press perhaps, should not meddle in. A second is the virtual absence of party-external lobbies concentrated on political matters such as the selection of prime minister or chief secretary. A third is the deep-rooted popular practice of disconnecting from serious political debate and other forms of engagement after elections. And a fourth is the amorphousness of political comment. Bad, extremely troubling choices will therefore be thrown up by the political culture.
So that if, say, Ramesh emerges….
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